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Leonce Bargeron, Manoj Kulchania, and Shawn Thomas 
 
Abstract 
Accelerated share repurchases (ASRs) are credible commitments by firms to 
repurchase shares immediately. Including an ASR in a repurchase program reduces the 
flexibility that firms have to alter an announced program in response to subsequent 
changes in the price and liquidity of its shares, unexpected shocks to cash flow and/or 
investment, etc. Thus, we investigate whether firms’ decisions to include ASRs in their 
repurchase programs are associated with factors expected to influence the costs of lost 
flexibility and the benefits of enhanced credibility and immediacy. We find robust 
evidence consistent with the costs of lost flexibility and the benefits of credibility and 
immediacy being important determinants of ASR adoption. Additionally, we find that ASR 
announcements are associated with positive average abnormal stock returns.  
 
1. Introduction 
A fundamental area of research in financial economics is the study of firms’ payout 
policies. The level, frequency, and form of payouts have individually and collectively been the 
subject of considerable investigation.3 This paper examines a recent and important innovation in 
the share repurchase form of payouts, namely, accelerated share repurchases (ASRs). 
Specifically, we analyze the determinants of the choice to include an ASR as part of a 
repurchase program as well as the choice of the fraction of the shares in a program to be 
obtained via an ASR. We also document the stock price reactions to announcements of ASRs.  
In an accelerated share repurchase, a firm enters into a contract with an intermediary, 
typically an investment bank, whereby the intermediary immediately delivers a specified number 
of the firm’s shares in exchange for cash based on an agreed upon price per share (ordinarily the 
most recent closing price). The intermediary obtains the shares that it delivers to the 
repurchasing firm by borrowing them, typically from institutions. The intermediary then covers its 
short position by purchasing shares in the market over a specified time period, normally several 
months. The ASR contract also includes a provision whereby the repurchasing firm is required to 
compensate or is entitled to receive compensation from the intermediary in shares or cash. The 
amount of compensation is based on the difference between the initial price per share paid to the 
intermediary and the estimated price per share the firm would have paid for the shares in an 
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open market repurchase (OMR) conducted during the same period over which the intermediary 
buys the shares to cover its short position. The settlement terms are also structured to 
compensate the repurchasing firm for the opportunity cost of full prepayment for the initial shares 
when the intermediary actually acquires these shares (closes its short position) over a period of 
several months. Note that, absent any contractual caps or floors on the settlement amount, the 
repurchasing firm bears all of the risk of changes in its stock price between ASR initiation and 
settlement. Thus, the intermediary essentially acts as the firm’s proxy in borrowing the firm’s 
shares and the proceeds the intermediary receives at initiation are a source of financing for the 
intermediary. In sum, ASRs are repurchases with an associated forward contract that can be 
settled in cash or shares of the firm.4 Fig. 1 illustrates the structure and timeline of an ASR and 
Appendix A includes a description of the common provisions observed in ASR contracts. 
For a sample of repurchase programs announced between 1996 and 2008, we collect 
data on whether or not the programs include an ASR as well as details of the ASR transactions. 
The frequency of ASRs has increased dramatically in recent years. Over the period 2004–2008, 
$131 billion of stock was repurchased via ASRs, and, in 2007, ASR announcements (97) 
represented about 26% of the total number of program announcements (376) as illustrated in Fig. 
2. Further, over the period 2004–2008, the frequency of ASRs has generally exceeded that of 
privately negotiated repurchases, fixed-price self-tender offers, Dutch-auction self-tender offers, 
and large special dividends as illustrated in Fig. 3. Lastly, we note that in recent years, the 
‘‘boilerplate’’ language used by firms to announce repurchase program authorizations has 
evolved to generally include ASRs as potential mechanisms by which share repurchases will be 
implemented.5 In short, ASRs have become part of the repurchase vernacular and an important 
element of repurchase program activity. 
We analyze the stage of payout policy formulation where a firm has concluded that a 
share repurchase is the optimal choice for distributing cash to shareholders and must now 
decide how best to execute the repurchase. Given the vast majority of repurchase programs in 
recent years have been executed via OMRs in which firms announce authorizations to 
repurchase shares periodically at market prices, we initially consider the decision to undertake 
ASRs relative to the alternative of repurchase programs comprised of OMRs. In a subsequent 
section of the paper, we consider the decision to undertake an ASR relative to executing 
repurchase programs, in part, via self-tender offers or privately negotiated transactions. 
In contrast to conducting an OMR-only repurchase program, including an ASR in a 
program commits the firm to actually repurchase shares and the firm receives these shares 
immediately. Consequently, the larger the ASR portion of a repurchase program, the less 
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flexibility the firm retains to significantly alter the program in response to subsequent changes in 
the price and liquidity of its stock, unexpected shocks to cash flow and/or investment, etc.6 In 
other words, the choice to undertake an ASR in a repurchase program represents a substantial 
partial exercise of the ‘‘flexibility option’’ inherent in a repurchase program that would otherwise 
be comprised entirely of OMRs, e.g., see Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) and Oded (2005). 
Therefore, factors affecting the costs of early exercise of the flexibility option inherent in an OMR 
should be important determinants of a firm’s choice to include an ASR in a repurchase program, 
a possibility we refer to as the flexibility hypothesis. 
In an ASR, the repurchasing firm is credibly committed by contract to repurchase a 
significant number of shares immediately from the intermediary. In contrast, Stephens and 
Weisbach (1998) show that, 3 years after an OMR announcement, a substantial number of firms 
have repurchased no shares, about 10% of firms repurchased less than 5% of the shares 
authorized, and just more than half of firms bought back the total number of shares authorized.7 
Simkovic (2009) reports that OMR completion rates have increased recently perhaps in 
response to enhanced required disclosures regarding repurchase activity.8 However, given the 
need to access quarterly filings for this information, OMR repurchases can still only be verified 
with significant time lags. ASRs entail no such delay or required verification by investors. Thus, 
the ASR portion of a repurchase program permits the firm to more credibly and quickly 
accomplish certain goals, e.g., signaling information to shareholders, adjusting capital structure, 
defending against an unwanted takeover attempt, avoiding dilution from the exercise of 
employee stock options, or managing reported earnings per share through changes in shares 
outstanding. To the extent that certain objectives of a repurchase would be better met with 
enhanced credibility and rapid completion of the repurchase, the particular objectives for a 
program should also influence a firm’s decision to include an ASR in the program, a possibility 
that we refer to as the credibility and immediacy hypothesis.  
We find that the choice to undertake an ASR is significantly negatively (positively) 
associated with the variability of the firm’s share price and the stock market illiquidity of the firm’s 
shares (the size of the repurchase authorization). These findings are strongly consistent with the 
predictions of the flexibility hypothesis. 
We find that the recent stock price performance of firms conducting ASRs is significantly 
better than firms not conducting ASRs, which is somewhat inconsistent with ASRs being used by 
firms facing greater undervaluation. However, further investigation of the undervaluation motive 
for ASRs using a variety of proxies for misvaluation generates some evidence suggesting that 
firms facing greater undervaluation are more likely to conduct ASRs. We find that firms tend to 
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include ASRs when the firms have fewer growth opportunities or are further below their target 
leverage ratios. We also find that firms tend to include ASRs when the firms have recently 
completed asset sales or been the targets of unsolicited takeover attempts. Lastly, we find 
limited evidence that ASRs are undertaken to manage reported earnings per share (EPS). Taken 
together, these results are consistent with the predictions of the credibility and immediacy 
hypothesis. 
The time series of ASR activity is also shown to vary with changes in the firm 
characteristics that our analysis indicates are important in firms’ decisions to undertake ASRs. 
For instance, illiquidity and the standard deviation of returns increased during the recent 
upheaval in financial markets. Given these changes, our model predicts a sharp drop in the 
number of ASRs in 2008, an outcome which we observe in the data. We also find that relative to 
alternative repurchase methods and large special dividends, ASRs serve a unique role and 
represent an important innovation in payout methods.  
We also examine abnormal stock returns around ASR announcements. We find that 
ASRs announced simultaneously with repurchase programs are associated with positive and 
significant abnormal returns. Further, we find that ASRs announced subsequent to repurchase 
programs are also associated with positive and significant abnormal returns consistent with 
shareholders viewing these transactions as incrementally wealth increasing relative to 
repurchase programs comprised entirely of OMRs. Cross-sectional determinants of ASR 
abnormal returns are also investigated. We find that ASR announcement returns are positively 
associated with the fraction of shares repurchased via ASR, negatively associated with recent 
prior stock performance, and, consistent with ASRs reducing the likelihood of a successful 
acquisition, negatively associated with the firm having been the recent target of a takeover 
attempt. We also find that the likelihood that a firm announces an ASR subsequent to 
announcing a repurchase program is decreasing in the program announcement abnormal return. 
This finding is consistent with firms choosing to undertake an ASR to enhance the credibility of 
the signal inherent in the program announcement when that signal was weakly received by the 
market. 
Our findings contribute generally to the literature on share repurchases and specifically to 
the nascent literature on accelerated share repurchases. The earliest paper to make note of 
ASRs was Cook and Kim (2006) which finds that firms engaging in repurchases using derivative 
contracts are generally larger than OMR firms. Marquardt, Tan, and Young (2009) show that 
firms more frequently conduct ASRs when managers’ bonuses are tied to EPS, the repurchases 
are accretive to reported EPS for the period, and managers subsequently voluntarily leave the 
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firm. Marquardt et al. do not investigate the relative importance of the flexibility inherent in OMRs 
or the immediacy of ASRs (outside of reported EPS) in determining firms’ choices to undertake 
ASRs. The present paper finds limited evidence of earnings management motives for ASRs in 
the presence of proxies for the value of flexibility. Thus, while the present paper’s analysis 
indicates that earnings management is not likely the primary determinant of ASR choice, 
Marquardt et al. examine this issue in greater depth. 
In a contemporaneous working paper, Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang (2010) 
investigate many of the same potential explanations for ASRs as the present paper. However, 
despite the similarities in the papers’ aims, the conclusions reached by the papers in terms of 
which factors are associated with the decision to include an ASR as part of a repurchase 
program are very different. While Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang note prominently in their 
hypothesis development that an ASR does not permit a repurchasing firm the flexibility to change 
or discontinue a share repurchase as in an OMR, they do not include in their analysis several 
variables that proxy for the relative value of this flexibility across firms. In contrast, the present 
paper finds these variables to be the most important determinants of the choice to include an 
ASR in a program. As described below, our treatment of ASRs as part of repurchase programs is 
also distinct from that of Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang who classify firms as strictly conducting 
OMRs versus ASRs which is not consistent with certain features of the data that reveal how 
ASRs are used by firms. Thus, the differences in results and conclusions across the two papers 
are largely attributable to several important variables omitted by Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang 
as well as fundamental differences in sample construction. 
Michel, Oded, and Shaked (2010) report positive average announcement period 
abnormal returns and negative post-announcement drift for ASR firms. Michel et al. interpret this 
pattern of returns as indicating that the information content of ASRs is negative but the market 
does not recognize the full extent of the ‘‘negative news’’ at announcement. Also, Akyol, Kim, 
and Shekhar (2009) investigate the efficacy of ASRs as takeover defenses. They find that firms 
choosing to conduct ASRs are significantly more likely to have been the subject of takeover 
rumors prior to the ASRs; however, they also find that, after conducting ASRs, these firms are 
still more likely to receive bids perhaps indicating that ASRs are not effective takeover 
deterrents.  
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the predictions of the 
hypotheses to be tested. We describe our sample construction in Section 3. We report results in 
Section 4 and offer a concluding discussion in Section 5. 
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2. Predictions of the Hypotheses 
The cost of an ASR resulting from the early exercise of the flexibility option will clearly 
vary across firms. For instance, because the value of the flexibility option inherent in an OMR is 
increasing in the volatility of the firm’s stock price, greater volatility increases the cost of 
exercising the option to adjust the repurchase amounts and timing. Thus, the flexibility 
hypothesis predicts that firms with greater stock market volatility will be less likely to elect to 
conduct an ASR. 
Barclay and Smith (1988) posit that the stock market liquidity of a firm’s shares should be 
an important determinant of a manager’s choice of payout form, i.e., dividend versus repurchase. 
Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) report that, in surveys and interviews, more than 
half of corporate executives ‘‘feel that the liquidity of their stock is an important or very important 
factor affecting their repurchase decisions.’’ Similarly, Brockman, Howe, and Mortal (2008) find 
that firms initiating repurchases have significantly greater stock market liquidity than firms not 
initiating repurchases and repurchase size is increasing in the liquidity of the repurchasing firms’ 
shares. While the results from these papers apply to the general decision to repurchase, these 
findings also suggest that the cost of credibly committing to quickly repurchase shares via an 
ASR will be less for firms with higher stock market liquidity. Purchasing large numbers of shares 
quickly has a greater impact on the price of less liquid shares, incrementally increasing the 
average price paid for the less liquid shares. Thus, the flexibility hypothesis predicts that firms 
with less liquid stock will be less likely to conduct an ASR. 
Guay and Harford (2000) and Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) also 
examine the determinants of payout method choice and find that greater variability of operating 
income is associated with a higher probability of observing a repurchase versus a dividend. A 
firm with less predictable cash flows or investment opportunities stands to benefit more from the 
ability to adjust its payout policy in response to unanticipated changes in cash flows or 
investment needs. Thus, under the flexibility hypothesis, greater variability of cash flow and/or 
greater imbalance between cash flow and investment needs are expected to be associated with 
a reduced probability of including an ASR in a repurchase program. 
To the extent that a larger program authorization reflects an ex-ante intention to actually 
repurchase a substantial number of shares, all else equal, the marginal cost of the lost flexibility 
associated with an ASR will be lower for larger authorizations as the decision to repurchase 
these shares is less sensitive to changes in firm characteristics or the market for its shares. Thus, 
under the flexibility hypothesis, we would expect larger programs to be more likely to include an 
ASR.9 
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In summary, the flexibility hypothesis predicts that, all else equal, the costs of an ASR are 
greater for firms with greater stock price uncertainty, less stock market liquidity of its shares, less 
predictable cash flows, greater imbalance between cash flow and investment needs, and smaller 
program authorizations.  
Many studies investigate the signaling motivation for repurchases, i.e., the notion that 
repurchases can be used to signal better future prospects or a willingness on the part of 
managers to distribute free cash flow to shareholders rather than overinvest (e.g., see 
Vermaelen, 1981). Regardless of the particular information being signaled, an ASR or a rapidly 
completed and verifiable OMR could serve to convey this information, albeit with a delay in 
establishing the credibility of the OMR. Including an ASR strengthens the credibility of the signal 
as shareholders do not have to wait to determine and verify the share purchases as they must 
with an OMR. The value of a stronger signal varies across firms. Presumably, a firm facing 
declining investment opportunities and generating large free cash flows or receiving a large 
non-recurring free cash flow would benefit more from a stronger signal of its commitment to 
return cash to shareholders (e.g., see Jensen, 1986; Grullon and Michaely, 2004). Similarly, 
firms that face greater undervaluation might view including an ASR in a program as 
strengthening this signal as well.  
An ASR is also expected to increase the effectiveness of a repurchase program as a 
takeover defense. Bagwell (1991) demonstrates that a Dutch-auction repurchase decreases the 
likelihood of a takeover if the supply curve for shares is positively sloped (e.g., see Brown and 
Ryngaert, 1991). Also, Billet and Xue (2007) find empirical support for the role of repurchases as 
takeover defenses in a sample of OMRs. In this context, the inclusion of an ASR in a repurchase 
program increases the effectiveness of a program as a takeover defense because the ASR 
ensures the necessary number of shares is repurchased immediately. Therefore, the credibility 
and immediacy hypothesis predicts that an ASR is more likely in a repurchase program 
implemented to defend against a takeover (e.g., see Akyol, Kim, and Shekhar, 2009). 
Firms can use a repurchase to adjust capital structure. Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman 
(2001) find that repurchases tend to increase firms’ leverage ratios towards their ‘‘target’’ 
leverage ratios. If the benefit of a capital structure adjustment increases as the distance from the 
target level increases, then an ASR is more likely in firms that are further below their target 
leverage ratios because the effects of an ASR are more immediate. 
Managers can use share repurchases to manipulate reported quarterly accounting 
information.10 In particular, managers whose bonuses are explicitly tied to EPS have an incentive 
to undertake repurchases to increase their expected bonuses (e.g., Cheng, Harford, and Zhang, 
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2009). With an ASR, the number of shares outstanding adjusts as soon as the shares are 
delivered to the firm by the intermediary, which occurs immediately after the ASR agreement is in 
place. With an OMR, the adjustment does not occur until the firm buys the shares in the market. 
As a result, an ASR has a larger impact on the average number of shares outstanding used in 
the calculation of the accounting ratios in the period in which it is undertaken. Thus, the decision 
to include an ASR in a repurchase program could be, in part, motivated by a desire on the part of 
managers to quickly manipulate earnings for the current period. 
In summary, the credibility and immediacy hypothesis predicts that the benefits of 
enhanced credibility and immediacy of ASRs are larger for firms where the repurchases are 
motivated by a desire on the part of managers to: signal their willingness to return cash to 
shareholders in an expedited manner, signal undervaluation, defend against unwanted takeover 
attempts, increase leverage towards a target ratio, or manage reported earnings per share. 
 
3. Sample Formation and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1. ASR Sample 
We search the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Edgar database for any 
filing that mentions an accelerated share repurchase. The Edgar Full-Text searchable database 
includes a rolling window of the previous 4 years of SEC filings. Our initial search was conducted 
on October 2, 2007; hence, we obtained search results for all filings dated October 2, 2003 and 
later. We have continued to access the database quarterly to update the sample of ASRs. Given 
the rolling time window limitation of the Full-Text database, we also search Factiva for any 
newswire or business publication story that mentions an ASR in the period January 1996 through 
December 2008.11 We corroborate news reports of ASRs by reviewing contemporaneous SEC 
filings and every ASR in our sample is definitively reported as such in an SEC filing.12 Our search 
efforts identify a total of 256 distinct ASR transactions and we gather details about the 
transactions from filings, announcement stories, and actual ASR agreements. 
Panel A of Table 1 details the number of ASR transactions announced in each year of the 
sample period. The earliest ASR in our sample was announced in 1997. The number of ASRs is 
very small for each year in the sample prior to 2004; however, the number of ASRs increases 
dramatically each year beginning in 2004 and reaches a high of 97 in 2007 before declining to 25 
in 2008. Fig. 2 plots the ratio of ASRs to total repurchase programs announced for each year of 
the sample period as an approximate indication of how important ASR activity has become 
among repurchase programs. While not reported in Table 1, we observe at least one ASR in 
each of the 12 Fama and French (1997) industry classifications with financials, wholesale, and 
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business equipment the three most frequently represented industries.13 
Panel B of Table 1 reports the transaction characteristics of the ASRs in our sample. The 
mean (median) deal size is $530.55 ($250.00) million which represents, on average, 5.3% of the 
outstanding equity of the firms at the time of the announcements. For reference, Grullon and 
Michaely (2004) report that, for the period 1980 through 1997, the average repurchase program 
authorization represents 6.8% of outstanding equity. Considering an ASR is generally only a 
portion of a repurchase program and is completed over a very short time frame in comparison 
with the OMR portion of the program, ASRs are clearly significant buyback events for firms. On 
average, the shares repurchased via each ASR comprise approximately 58.0% of the program 
authorization. 
For the 93 transactions for which we are able to obtain information on the price per share 
paid to the intermediary at the initiation of the ASR, we compute the percentage difference 
between the price paid to the intermediary under the ASR agreement and the closing price of the 
stock on the previous trading day. The mean (median) percentage difference between the ASR 
agreement price and the previous closing price is 0.13% (0.00%). The vast majority of ASRs do 
not involve the intermediary receiving any significant premium or accepting any discount for the 
shares they initially deliver to the repurchasing firm. We are able to obtain the details of the 
settlement period for 178 of the ASRs in our sample, and the average settlement period was 
approximately 140 calendar days. In the 103 (71) instances where the intermediary made 
(received) a payment to (from) the repurchasing firm at settlement, the payment averaged $54.2 
($33.5) million. Approximately 42% of the contracts were settled in cash with the remainder 
settled in shares of the repurchasing firm. Finally, we note that 24% of ASRs in our sample 
included a cap, floor, or collar provision associated with the settlement terms. Panel C reports 
the stated motivations for our sample of ASRs. Approximately 31% of firms mention 
undervaluation as one of the motivations for the ASR transaction. The next most frequently 
stated motivation is the desire to alter capital structure.  
 
3.2. Repurchase Programs 
Our sample of repurchase program announcements is obtained primarily from the 
Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database on Mergers and Acquisitions. Initially, we consider 
programs announced between January 1996 and December 2008. We match each ASR with a 
repurchase program identified in SDC or via a search of Factiva.14 While 62 of the ASRs are 
announced simultaneously with a repurchase program, the remaining ASRs are announced after 
a program. Thus, we match each ASR with the program that immediately preceded the ASR 
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announcement. Our treatment of ASRs as part of repurchase programs is distinct from that of 
Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang (2010) and Marquardt, Tan, and Young (2009) who classify 
firms as strictly conducting OMRs versus ASRs. We note that this approach forces Chemmanur, 
Cheng, and Zhang to drop observations where firms announce repurchase programs on the 
same day or even in the same month as an ASR.15 The strict classification of firms as ASR 
versus OMR is not consistent with certain features of the data that reveal how ASRs are used by 
firms. For instance, nearly 25% of our sample ASRs are announced simultaneously with OMRs 
and the overwhelming majority of ASRs are announced within one year of an OMR program 
announcement which indicates that ASRs and OMRs are not pure substitutes in repurchase 
programs. 
The 256 ASRs in our sample can be linked to 220 distinct repurchase programs 
announced by 177 unique firms. The average (maximum) number of ASRs by a firm in a 
particular repurchase program is 1.2 (3.0) and the average (maximum) number of ASRs by firm 
regardless of program is 1.3 (7.0).  
 
4. Results 
4.1. Univariate Comparisons 
As reported in Table 1, nearly 95% of the ASRs in our sample were undertaken after 
2003. Thus, we limit our sample period to 2004 through 2008 when analyzing ASR election to 
ensure that we are comparing firm characteristics over a period when ASRs are not rare events. 
Table 2 reports characteristics of repurchasing firms based on whether or not they elect to 
include an ASR in a repurchase program. Details on data sources and variable construction are 
provided in Appendix B. Independent variables constructed using financial statement data for 
programs that do not include ASRs and for ASRs that are announced simultaneously with a 
program are measured at the fiscal year end immediately prior to the program announcement. 
Independent variables for ASRs that are not announced simultaneously with a program, i.e., 
subsequent ASRs, are measured at the fiscal year end immediately prior to the ASR 
announcement.  
ASRs require an intermediary to borrow a significant number of the repurchasing firm’s 
shares. Thus, for firms whose securities are subject to binding short-sale constraints, including 
ASRs in their repurchase programs may not be feasible. As reported in Table 2, no firm 
conducted an ASR when, in the month prior to the announcement, its shares were identified as 
short-sale constrained. To ensure that we are comparing ASR election across firms for which an 
ASR is feasible, we restrict our analysis to those program announcements by firms that are not 
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short-sale constrained. This restriction excludes from the analysis 60 programs without ASRs.16  
As an indication of the uncertainty regarding the value of a firm’s shares, we calculate the 
standard deviation of daily stock returns prior to the repurchase announcement. ASR firms have 
less volatile share prices than non-ASR firms and the difference in means (medians) is highly 
significant as indicated by a t-test (Wilcoxon rank sum test). As an indication of the stock market 
liquidity of a firm’s shares, we calculate the Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity. As indicated in 
Table 2, firms not including ASRs in their repurchase programs have markets for their shares 
that are significantly less liquid (higher logarithm of illiquidity) than firms including ASRs in their 
programs.  
Firms conducting ASRs tend to be larger relative to those firms that do not conduct ASRs. 
Somewhat surprisingly, firms including ASRs in repurchase programs have significantly smaller 
holdings of cash and marketable securities relative to assets and slightly lower levels of free 
cash flow relative to assets. However, firms electing to undertake ASRs have significantly less 
volatile free cash flows which may account for why these firms also hold less cash on their 
balance sheets since, all else equal, reduced uncertainty in cash flows would prompt firms to 
hold less cash as a precaution against unanticipated changes in cash flows (e.g., see Bates, 
Kahle, and Stulz, 2009). 
A large positive correlation between a firm’s cash flows and investment needs indicates 
that a firm generally has higher cash flows when investment needs are high and, hence, has less 
need for a hedging program to better align its cash flows and investment needs (e.g., see Froot, 
Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993). A large negative correlation would imply that the firm will not have 
free cash flow to invest when investment needs are high and, as such, the firmhas ahigherneed 
forahedgingprogram to betteralign cash flow and investment needs. Firms conducting ASRs are 
significantly less frequently identified as having high hedging needs relative to those firms 
conducting repurchases comprised entirely of OMRs. This is consistent with firms avoiding ASRs 
when the correlation between their cash flows and investment needs is low. The frequency with 
which ASR versus non-ASR firms are identified as low hedging needs firms does not significantly 
differ across the two groups. Programs including ASRs have significantly larger program 
authorization amounts, as a percentage of outstanding equity, than programs not including 
ASRs.  
Previous literature shows that firms generally experience significant negative 
performance prior to announcing OMR programs, a pattern that is evident in our sample of 
non-ASR programs as well. Interestingly, the average abnormal return prior to a firm announcing 
an ASR is indistinguishable from zero but significantly greater than for programs without ASRs, 
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perhaps consistent with ASRs being motivated by factors other than a desire to signal 
undervaluation. 
Firms conducting ASRs have smaller mean and median market-to-book ratios but the 
differences are not statistically significant. We follow Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan 
(2005) in decomposing the natural logarithm of market-to-book into three components, which 
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan refer to as firm, sector, and long-run. While we 
observe no significant differences between ASR and non-ASR firms in terms of firm-specific 
misvaluation relative to fundamental value or differences between valuations based on current 
versus long-run sector multiples, we do observe that non-ASR firms have significantly larger 
median but not mean measures of long-run growth options. 
Approximately 24% of firms undertaking an ASR completed an asset sale in the prior 6 
months compared with only 10% of firms not undertaking an ASR. Thus, it appears that the ASR 
decision is in part driven by a desire of managers to signal a willingness to return the proceeds of 
asset sales to shareholders in an expedited fashion. Consistent with an ASR being more likely 
when employed as part of a takeover defense, we find that firms conducting an ASR are 
significantly more likely to have been the target of a takeover attempt than firms not including an 
ASR in a repurchase program. ASR firms have higher debt ratios than non-ASR firms with the 
median (mean) difference across the two groups significant at the 1% (10%) level. ASR firms are 
not significantly farther below their ‘‘target’’ leverage ratios than non-ASR firms. Similar to 
Marquardt, Tan, and Young (2009), univariate comparisons reveal that firms conducting ASRs 
are more likely to base chief executive officer (CEO) bonuses on EPS, to have CEOs that are 
also chairmen, and to experience voluntary turnover of the CEO in the year following the ASR. 
In sum, the univariate analysis reveals that firms including ASRs in their repurchase 
programs have less variable stock prices, greater stock market liquidity, greater firm size, less 
variable cash flows, less imbalance between cash flows and investment needs, larger program 
authorizations, better recent stock performance, more frequent recent asset sales and 
unsolicited takeover attempts, more frequent use of EPS as a basis for bonuses, more frequent 
CEO/chairmen, and more frequent post-repurchase voluntary turnover of the CEO than firms not 
including ASRs in their repurchase programs. Additionally, no short-sale constrained firms 
included ASRs in their repurchase programs. While the univariate results are informative and 
generally consistent with our hypotheses, the usual caveats about making inferences based on 
univariate comparisons apply. Thus, we next turn our attention to multivariate investigation of the 
choice to include an ASR as part of a repurchase program. 
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4.2. Logit Regressions of ASR Election 
Table 3 reports the results of logit regressions explaining ASR election. The coefficients 
on the independent variables are reported along with their p-values based on robust standard 
errors clustered by firm. Year and industry dummies are also included in the regressions but, to 
conserve space, the coefficients are not reported.  
As in the univariate tests, we limit the analysis in Table 3 to those programs announced 
by firms which are not short-sale constrained and to ASRs announced in 2004 or later. Other 
than short-selling its own shares, the key features of an ASR could be nearly duplicated by a 
repurchasing firm (especially if the firm were willing to forfeit 10b-18 ‘‘safe harbor’’ protection) 
with a large, easily verifiable, expedited OMR.17 Thus, the intermediary in an ASR functions as a 
proxy through which a firm can borrow its own shares and there is a relatively competitive market 
for providing this service.18 Thus, the only real ‘‘supply’’ hurdle a firm might face in conducting an 
ASR is if an intermediary cannot borrow the firm’s shares. Hence, by conducting our analysis on 
all programs except for those deemed short-sale constrained, we can reliably interpret the 
coefficients on the specifications below as reflecting how firms’ characteristics are associated 
with firms’ demand for an ASR, i.e., the net benefits to the firm of conducting an ASR.19 
As reported in specification (1), firms with greater stock price volatility are significantly 
less likely to include ASRs as a part of their repurchase programs. Similarly, firms with less liquid 
markets for their shares are significantly less likely to undertake ASRs. Firms with larger program 
authorizations are significantly more likely to conduct ASRs. Taken together, these findings are 
consistent with the flexibility hypothesis.20 As in the univariate analysis, the coefficient on Prior 
stock price performance is positive, indicating that ASRs are not announced subsequent to 
relatively poor performance as would be expected if ASRs were utilized to signal undervaluation. 
The negative coefficient on Ln(Market-to-book) can be interpreted as evidence that firms with 
declining growth options use ASRs to signal a commitment not to overinvest. The asset sale 
indicator enters with a positive and significant coefficient consistent with ASRs being motivated, 
in part, by the desire of managers to signal a willingness to pay out non-recurring cash inflows to 
shareholders. Firms that were the subject of recent takeover interest were also more likely to 
include an ASR as were firms that were further below their target leverage ratios. Lastly, none of 
the variables intended to reflect motive and opportunity to manage EPS via ASRs are significant. 
In sum, these results are consistent with the flexibility hypothesis and the credibility and 
immediacy hypothesis. 
As an additional test of signaling undervaluation as a motive for ASRs, in specification (2), 
we replace the market-to-book ratio with its components. We find that M/B firm, the firm-specific 
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deviation from value, is negative and significant. Thus, consistent with an undervaluation motive 
for ASRs, firms that are subject to greater firm-specific undervaluation are more likely to 
undertake ASRs. Also, we find that firms with greater long-run growth opportunities are less likely 
to conduct ASRs.21 
Next, we examine the characteristics of firms that announce a repurchase program and 
an ASR simultaneously. A simultaneous ASR might be an indication that, in light of the objective 
of the repurchase, enhanced credibility and immediacy are viewed as being particularly valuable. 
Specification (3) reports the results of a logit regression in which the dependent variable equals 
one for simultaneous ASRs. The sample excludes programs that include a subsequent ASR. As 
before, firms with greater stock price volatility and firms with less liquid markets for their shares 
are less likely to undertake simultaneous ASRs. All else equal, firms with larger authorizations, 
firms with better prior stock performance, firms with fewer growth opportunities, and firms facing 
the threat of a takeover are more likely to include simultaneous ASRs in their repurchase 
programs consistent with the benefits of credibility and immediacy being larger for these firms. 
To gauge the economic magnitude of the estimates, we select the model in specification 
(1) of Table 3 and calculate the effect of changes in the explanatory variables on the implied 
probability of including an ASR in the repurchase program. We vary the explanatory variables, 
one at a time, from the 25th percentile level to the 75th percentile level for scalar variables and 
from zero to one for dummy variables. All other variables are held constant at their sample 
means. For the standard deviation of returns variable, the estimated probability of including an 
ASR in the repurchase program of the firm decreases from 11.6% to 4.4%. The corresponding 
estimates for the Ln(Illiquidity) variable are 17.3% to 3.2%. These results indicate that the 
probability of including an ASR in a repurchase program decreases sharply as the variability of a 
firm’s share price or the illiquidity of its stock increases. Increasing the size of the program 
authorization corresponds to a change in the estimated probability of an ASR from 5.3% to 7.5%. 
As Ln(Market-to-book) increases, the estimated probability of an ASR decreases from 9.5% to 
4.2%. As the distance from optimal leverage increases, the probability of ASR increases from 5.9% 
to 7.6%. Also, an increase in Prior stock performance corresponds to an increase in the 
probability of an ASR from 5.4% to 8.4%. Finally, for the takeover (asset sale) variable, the 
estimated probability of an ASR in the repurchase program increases from 6.3% to 18.0% (6.2% 
to 9.7%) as the variable changes from zero to one. Thus, the factors that are found to be 
statistically significant in the analysis above are also economically significant in the decision to 
include an ASR in a repurchase program.  
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4.3. Robustness and Additional Results 
In unreported results, we find that the inverse relation between illiquidity and the 
likelihood of ASR inclusion is robust to alternative measures of illiquidity. Specifically, we 
consider three alternative measures: the natural logarithm of quoted spread calculated as the log 
of the ratio of the offer price minus the bid price to the trade price; the log of the effective spread 
as defined in Lee (1993); and the log of the price impact measure defined in Huang and Stoll 
(1996). We substitute these measures for Ln(Illiquidity) into the logit regression in specification (1) 
of Table 3. The resulting coefficients on the measures of illiquidity are -1.004, -1.240, and -1.077, 
respectively, and each is significant at the 1% level. Thus, greater illiquidity, as proxied for by any 
of the alternative measures, is associated with a decreased probability of including an ASR in a 
program. 
In the results reported in Table 3, we place no restriction on how timely the ASR 
announcement is relative to the repurchase program announcement. When we rerun 
specification (1) of Table 3 excluding the 27 ASRs in our sample that are not announced within 
365 days of a program, the results are very similar to those reported. Additionally, the results 
continue to hold for the sub-sample where regulated (financial and utility) firms are excluded. 
Given the upheaval in financial markets in 2008, we also repeated our analysis on the 
subsample of repurchase programs announced prior to 2008. The results are very similar to 
those reported in Table 3. 
The analysis in Table 3 assumes a linear relation between ASR choice and our 
independent variables. To allow for nonlinearities, we mean center the variables found to be 
significant in specification (1) of Table 3 and include squared terms. The coefficients on the linear 
variables remain significant with the exception of Ln(Illiquidity), Ln(Assets), Ln(Market-to-book), 
and Leverage difference. The coefficient on squared illiquidity is negative and significant 
suggesting that the relation between illiquidity and the likelihood of an ASR is predominantly 
attributable to more illiquid firms. The coefficients on squared program size and squared 
leverage difference are also negative and significant. The coefficients on squared standard 
deviation of returns, squared log of assets, squared prior stock performance, and squared 
market-to-book are insignificant. The signs and significance of the other coefficients remain 
unchanged. We have also winsorized each of the continuous independent variables in Table 3 at 
their respective 1st and 99th percentiles. Results using the winsorized variables are nearly 
identical to those reported. 
 
  
 
16  Bargeron, Kulchania, Thomas 
4.4. Fraction of Program Completed via ASR 
While the preceding analysis investigates the decision to include an ASR in a repurchase 
program, we now turn our attention to the fraction of the authorized repurchase that is completed 
via ASR. Specification (1) of Table 4 reports the results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression where the dependent variable is the cumulative fraction of a program that is 
completed via ASRs and the regression is estimated over the sample of programs including 
ASRs.22 Many of the coefficients on the explanatory variables have differing signs and 
significance relative to those we observe in our logit models predicting an ASR. Thus, conditional 
on the inclusion of an ASR, the mechanism governing the fraction of the program completed via 
ASRs is in many ways different from that which governs the inclusion of an ASR. 
To reconcile the OLS and logit results in a simple unconditional model, we estimate a 
multinomial logit model predicting which of three groups (no ASR, low ASR, and high ASR) a 
program will fall into. The low (high) fraction ASR group contains those programs where the 
cumulative fraction of the program completed via ASRs is less than or equal to (greater than) 
50%. Specification (2) reports coefficients for no ASR vs. low fraction ASR. The results indicate 
that the factors determining the relative likelihood of observing a low fraction ASR rather than no 
ASR are quite similar to those we find above when predicting the inclusion of an ASR. 
Interestingly, the coefficients on EPS bonus and Voluntary turnover are positive and significant at 
the 10% level, perhaps consistent with managers undertaking low fraction ASRs in an effort to 
‘‘borrow a penny’’ to increase their bonuses ahead of a voluntary turnover (e.g., see Marquardt, 
Tan, and Young, 2009). Taken together, the results from specification (2) indicate that our 
flexibility and credibility and immediacy variables are significantly related to the decision to take 
on ASRs that in total account for less than 50% of a program authorization. 
Specification (3) reports coefficients for no ASR vs. high fraction ASR. In addition to 
standard deviation of returns and illiquidity, the high hedge indicator is negative and significant 
and the standard deviation of cash flows is negative but not quite significant at conventional 
levels (p-value of 0.115). Consistent with the predictions of the flexibility hypothesis, these 
results indicate that proxies for the value of flexibility are important determinants of firms’ 
decisions to conduct high fraction ASRs. The positive and significant coefficient on the asset sale 
indicator suggests that firms use high fraction ASRs as vehicles to return the proceeds from 
asset sales to shareholders. The positive but not quite significant coefficient on Leverage 
difference hints at high fraction ASRs also being partly motivated by a desire to move towards a 
target leverage ratio. Also, as evidenced by the negative and significant coefficient on EPS 
bonus, managers do not appear to undertake high fraction ASRs to enhance their bonuses, 
 
17  Bargeron, Kulchania, Thomas 
perhaps consistent with ASRs being effective tools for modest earnings management but not for 
dramatically altering reported EPS. Taken together, these results indicate that the factors 
determining the relative likelihood of observing a high fraction ASR rather than no ASR are 
similar to those we find above when predicting the inclusion of an ASR. 
Specification (4) reports coefficients for low vs. high fraction ASRs. The results indicate 
that the factors associated with the likelihood of including low fraction rather than high fraction 
ASRs are somewhat different than the factors that determine the choice between an OMR-only 
program and a program including an ASR. The coefficients on illiquidity and standard deviation 
of returns are not significant. However, firms with greater standard deviation of cash flows or 
greater imbalance between cash flows and investment needs are less likely to conduct high 
fraction ASRs, consistent with the flexibility hypothesis. The coefficient on asset sale in 
specification (4) is positive, consistent with firms more frequently choosing high fraction ASRs 
subsequent to asset sales; however, the coefficient is not significant at conventional levels. 
Firms are significantly less likely to undertake high fraction ASRs relative to low fraction ASRs 
when managers’ bonuses are tied to EPS, which suggests that low fraction ASRs are preferable 
for the purposes of increasing reported EPS. 
Taken as a whole, our evidence on the fraction of programs completed via ASRs 
presents a picture whereby factors that we associate with flexibility, credibility, and immediacy 
are associated with the decision to undertake either low or high fraction ASRs. However, the 
decision to undertake high fraction ASRs relative to low fraction ASRs appears to be less clearly 
driven by these factors. 
 
4.5. Why Do ASRs Decline in 2008? 
Fig. 2 reveals that the ratio of ASR announcements to repurchase program 
announcements increases from 2004 through 2007 and then drops sharply in 2008.23 To 
investigate whether our model of ASR choice explains the sharp drop in ASRs, we estimate the 
probability of including an ASR for each firm that announces a repurchase program. Specifically, 
we estimate the coefficients of specification (1) in Table 3 based on the 2004–2007 data. We use 
the coefficient estimates to predict the probability of an ASR for the in-sample programs in 2004 
through 2007 and the out-of-sample programs in 2008. We define an indicator variable, 
Predicted ASR, that is equal to one if the estimated probability is above a specified threshold and 
zero otherwise. Because the unconditional probability of an ASR for the in-sample firms is 
16.96%, we define the threshold as the in-sample 83.04th percentile of Predicted ASR. The 
resulting threshold probability is 32.90%. Therefore, Predicted ASR equals one if the estimated 
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probability of including an ASR in a repurchase program is greater than 32.90% and zero 
otherwise. The predicted and observed percentages of ASRs for each year are reported in Table 
5. Strikingly, the predicted (observed) percentage drops sharply from 23.0% (20.6%) in 2007 to 
13.4% (6.4%) in 2008. The results suggest that the decrease in ASRs in 2008 is to a large 
degree due to changes in the characteristics of repurchasing firms. 
As an out-of-sample test of the validity of our predictions, we divide the 2008 repurchase 
programs into three groups based on the estimated probability of an ASR. Within each tercile, we 
total the number of ASRs observed. The totals, listed from the lowest third to the highest third, 
are one, three and 15 respectively. A Pearson chi-squared test rejects the hypothesis that the 
proportion of ASR firms is the same in each tercile with a p-value of 0.000. This suggests that our 
ASR model has significant power, out-of-sample, to predict which firms will include ASRs in their 
repurchase programs.  
 
4.6. ASRs Relative to Other Repurchase and Payout Methods 
While we characterize ASRs relative to OMR-only programs in the analysis above, other 
repurchase and payout methods are potential alternatives to ASRs. Thus, we investigate 
whether firms’ decisions to conduct ASRs are associated with their past or concurrent use of 
alternative repurchase or payout methods. Fig. 3 reports the annual frequency of ASRs, 
fixed-price self-tender offers, Dutch-auction self-tender offers, privately negotiated repurchases, 
and large special dividends (defined as greater than 5% of the market value of equity). The 
frequency of ASRs first exceeds fixed-price self-tenders and Dutch-auction self-tenders 
(privately negotiated repurchases) in 2004 (2005) and continues to exceed the respective types 
of repurchases through 2008. ASR frequency first exceeds large special dividends in 2005 and 
continues to exceed large specials until 2008 when large specials again become more frequent 
than ASRs. 
Visual inspection of Fig. 3 suggests that aggregate ASR frequency in recent years is 
positively correlated with that of the alternatives other than perhaps privately negotiated 
repurchases. It should also be noted that there are important distinctions between ASRs and the 
alternatives included in the figures. Thus, we consider below the relative choice of ASRs versus 
the various alternatives in light of these differences.  
In contrast to ASRs, Peyer and Vermaelen (2005) show that most privately negotiated 
repurchases are announced after the transaction with no intent by the firm to repurchase more 
shares. Also, only about 109 out of 737 transactions in their sample are conducted at market 
prices with the majority involving a premium (greenmail) or discount. Further, the zero premium 
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deals are typically repurchases from insiders who exercise options and prefer to sell their shares 
to the firm. Nonetheless, we include dummy variables in specification (1) of Table 3 indicating, 
respectively, whether a firm had completed a privately negotiated repurchase in the 3 years prior 
to the program announcement or in the one year after the program announcement. In short, 
neither dummy enters the regression significantly suggesting that, at the firm level, ASRs serve a 
unique role relative to privately negotiated repurchases. 
Note that while tender offer repurchases, like ASRs, are credible commitments to 
repurchase and can be completed relatively quickly, tender offer repurchases (both fixed-price 
and Dutch-auction) nearly always result in selling shareholders receiving significant premiums 
(e.g., see Comment and Jarrell, 1991). As an indication of whether or not ASRs are substituting 
for tender offer repurchases, we include dummy variables in specification (1) of Table 3 reflecting 
whether a firm had completed a fixed-price tender offer or a Dutch-auction repurchase, 
respectively, in the 3 years prior to the program announcement or the one year after the program 
announcement. In the specification including the Dutch-auction dummies, neither of the 
dummies is significant. In the specification including the fixed-price dummies, the variable 
reflecting prior fixed-price repurchase activity is positive and significant at the 10% level. Further, 
we note that no firm that conducted an ASR in a program also conducted a fixed-price tender 
offer in the same program (which makes including the dummy for concurrent fixed-price offers 
infeasible). This outcome could be interpreted as indicating ASRs are perfect substitutes for 
fixed-price repurchases or that ASRs and fixed-price repurchases are used to achieve entirely 
different objectives. Given the large premiums conveyed in fixed-price repurchases and the 
absence of any premium in ASRs, the latter interpretation seems more likely. Thus, taken 
together, these results suggest that ASRs serve a unique role relative to self-tender offers. 
On a continuum of the credibility of commitment among payout types, it could be argued 
that ASRs would lie near declaring a large special cash dividend (e.g., see DeAngelo, DeAngelo, 
and Skinner, 2000). Thus, we create dummy variables indicating whether a firm had completed a 
large special dividend in the 3 years prior to the program announcement or the one year after the 
program announcement. In short, no firm that paid a large special dividend also undertook an 
ASR. Given that large specials are often issued as part of major corporate restructurings 
(average payout of 17.3% of the market value of equity over 2004–2008) whereas ASRs 
(average 5.3% of the market value of equity over 2004–2008) are not, this suggests that the 
objectives for these respective transactions differ substantially. As a further indication, we create 
dummy variables reflecting whether a firm had issued any special dividend in the 3 years prior to 
the program announcement or the one year after the program announcement. Neither dummy 
 
20  Bargeron, Kulchania, Thomas 
enters the regression significantly suggesting that ASRs serve a unique role relative to special 
dividends. 
In sum, ASRs appear to represent an important innovation relative not only to OMR-only 
programs, but also to alternative payout methods like self-tender offers, privately negotiated 
repurchases, and large special dividends. It does not appear that ASRs are simply substituting 
for alternative payout methods. Thus, our characterization of the choice to include an ASR as 
being relative to an OMR-only program appears to accurately reflect how ASRs are used in 
practice. 
 
4.7. Abnormal Returns Analysis 
Table 6 reports the abnormal returns for the repurchase announcements in our sample. 
We calculate the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in the window -1 to +1 in trading 
days relative to the repurchase announcement. CARs are calculated using the standard 
event-study methodology (e.g., see Brown and Warner, 1980). The parameters of the market 
model are estimated over 255 trading days, ending 46 days prior to the announcement using the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value-weighted index as the market portfolio and 
requiring a minimum of 100 trading days over the estimation window. 
ASR announcements are met with positive and significant abnormal returns.24 Further, 
ASRs announced subsequent to repurchase programs are also associated with positive and 
significant abnormal returns consistent with shareholders viewing these transactions as 
incrementally wealth increasing relative to the previously announced repurchase programs. With 
the exception of the median returns to programs associated with subsequent ASRs, the mean 
and median returns for all program announcements are positive and significantly different from 
zero at the 5% level. Additionally, with the exception of programs associated with subsequent 
ASRs, positive announcement returns are significantly more frequent than negative 
announcement returns for all groups as indicated by sign tests. The evidence suggests that, on 
average, ASR announcements and program announcements are value-increasing events. We 
further find that the mean (median) return of 1.70% (2.01%) for programs announced 
simultaneously with ASRs is not significantly different than the mean (median) return of 1.46% 
(1.21%) for program announcements not associated with any ASR. 
Within the context of the credibility and immediacy hypothesis, a plausible objective for 
undertaking an ASR after a program has already been announced is that the response to the 
program announcement was weak and the firm wants to send a more credible signal. If this is the 
case, then we would expect program announcements associated with subsequent ASRs to have 
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lower announcement returns than program announcements not associated with any ASR. We 
investigate the validity of this conjecture for the pattern of returns by testing the differences 
across the two groups. The mean and median returns to programs without ASRs are larger than 
those for programs with subsequent ASRs with the differences between the median returns 
significant at the 5% level. Thus, the results of the univariate tests suggest that a lower return at 
program announcement may be a factor in a firm’s election to conduct a subsequent ASR. 
In Table 7, we analyze ASR announcement returns in a multivariate setting. The 
dependent variable in specifications (1) and (2) is the 3-day cumulative abnormal return around 
the ASR announcement, the sample is all ASR announcements from 2004 to 2008, and we 
include all of the independent variables considered in the logit regressions of Table 3 as well as 
the percentage of the firm’s outstanding equity that is repurchased in the ASR. Larger ASRs, as 
a fraction of the firm’s outstanding equity, are associated with greater announcement returns. 
Insofar as larger ASRs send stronger signals, this result supports the credibility and immediacy 
hypothesis. Prior stock performance is significantly negatively associated with announcement 
returns. ASRs announced when firms are targets of takeover attempts are met with lower 
abnormal returns, perhaps owing to the reduced likelihood that the proposed acquisitions will be 
completed in light of the ASRs. 
In specification (2), we split Ln(Market-to-book) into three components as in 
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005). The coefficient on firm-specific 
undervaluation is positive and marginally significant. However, each of the other two components 
is statistically insignificant.25 Further, the market-to-book ratio in specification (1) along with the 
uncertainty in returns, the illiquidity of the firm’s shares, and the size of the program authorization 
in both specifications are not significantly related to the returns. Given these characteristics are 
significant in Table 3, it appears that firms consider them when deciding to include an ASR such 
that differing values of the characteristics themselves are then unrelated to announcement 
returns.26 
Specification (3) reports the results of a logit regression where the dependent variable 
takes a value of one if a firm announced an ASR subsequent to announcing a repurchase 
program and zero if the program was not associated with an ASR. We include the market 
response to the repurchase program announcement as an independent variable. The 
significantly negative coefficient on the program announcement return is consistent with an ASR 
being a mechanism to send a more credible signal to the market after a relatively weak response 
to the program announcement. 
The univariate analysis in Table 6 suggests that announcement returns to programs 
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including simultaneous ASRs are not distinguishable from the returns to programs without ASRs. 
In specification (4) of Table 7,we test this in a multivariate setting. The sample for this test 
excludes programs that include a subsequent ASR. We regress the 3-day cumulative abnormal 
return for program announcements on our basic control variables and a variable indicating that 
the program includes a simultaneous ASR. Consistent with the univariate results, the coefficient 
on the simultaneous ASR indicator variable is not significant. 
Finally, in specification (5), we test whether the announcement returns to programs 
associated with any ASR differ from the returns to programs that are not associated with ASRs. 
For programs not associated with an ASR, the dependent variable in the regression, Combined 
CAR3, is the abnormal return at the program announcement. For programs associated with an 
ASR, the dependent variable is the sum of the abnormal returns at the program announcement 
and the abnormal returns for any subsequent ASRs conducted within the program. The indicator 
variable ASR is equal to one for a program that is associated with a simultaneous or subsequent 
ASR and zero otherwise. The insignificant coefficient on the ASR indicator variable suggests that 
the combined announcement returns for programs associated with at least one ASR are no 
different than the announcement returns for programs not associated with an ASR. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates ASRs, a recent and important innovation in share repurchase 
transactions, relative to both open market repurchases and other alternative methods of 
distributing excess cash to shareholders. ASRs are credible commitments by firms to repurchase 
shares immediately. Including an ASR in a repurchase program reduces the flexibility that firms 
have to alter an announced program in response to subsequent changes in the liquidity and price 
of its stock, firm conditions, etc. However, ASRs provide the benefits of enhanced credibility of 
commitment and immediate execution. Thus, we investigate whether firms’ decisions to include 
ASRs in their repurchase programs are associated with factors expected to influence the costs of 
lost flexibility and the benefits of enhanced credibility and immediacy. 
We find that the choice to undertake an ASR is significantly negatively associated with 
proxies for the costs of lost flexibility. We also find that firms are more likely to undertake ASRs in 
situations where the benefits of credibility and immediacy are larger. Further, our ASR model has 
significant power, out-of-sample, to predict which firms will include ASRs in their repurchase 
programs. We also show that ASR announcements are associated with positive and significant 
average abnormal returns. This result holds for ASRs announced simultaneously with a 
repurchase program and ASRs announced subsequent to the repurchase program 
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announcement. These results suggest that ASRs are, on average, value-increasing events and 
add incremental value when announced subsequent to a repurchase program announcement. 
 
Appendix A. Common Provisions in ASR Contracts 
Based on our review of 119 ASR agreements, we describe below the most common 
contractual provisions included in the agreements, e.g., see http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/354869/000095015206000339/l18060aexv99w1.htm 
Standard provisions of ASR agreements: 
 Date on which the intermediary will deliver the initial shares to the firm.  
 Number of initial shares the intermediary will borrow and deliver.  
 Price the firm will pay the intermediary for each initial share delivered.  
 Time period in which intermediary will purchase shares to cover its short position.  
 Time period over which the settlement price will be calculated.  
 Define volume weighted average price (VWAP) per share over specified period using 
only trades that qualify under SEC Rule 10b-18(b), i.e., excluding trades at the opening 
and during the last 30 minutes of the trading session (or last 10 minutes for liquid stocks) 
and trades where price exceeds the highest independent bid or the last independent 
transaction price.  
 Calculate settlement price as VWAP minus a discount to compensate firm for opportunity 
cost of full prepayment for initial shares when intermediary actually acquires these shares 
(closes its short position) over a period of several months.  
 Define cap or floor, if any, for the settlement amount.  
 Rights of each party to determine the method of settlement, i.e., cash or shares.  
 Provisions to reimburse the intermediary for costs incurred if they receive primary shares 
at settlement, e.g., private placement agreement, discount at resale, etc.  
 Stipulations for altering the agreement based on regular and extraordinary dividends, 
merger announcements, market disruptions, etc.  
 Requirement that firm must use the intermediary to repurchase any shares between ASR 
initiation and settlement.  
 Statement that firm will not attempt to evade SEC Rule 10b5-1 (insider trading) and will 
not seek to control or influence the intermediary’s purchases or sales. 
 Statement that the firm will give the intermediary written notice of a distribution of shares 
relating to Internal Revenue Service Regulation M.  
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 Reference definitions in the 2002 International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) 
Equity Derivatives Definitions. 
 
Non-standard provisions of ASR agreements, in approximate order of most frequently 
observed to least frequently observed: 
 Stipulate a maximum or minimum number of shares to be repurchased.  
 Specify a maximum cost (basis points per annum) that the intermediary is willing to incur 
to borrow the firm’s shares.  
 Specify a per share brokerage fee to be paid to the intermediary for initial shares.  
 Specify an up-front fee to be paid to the intermediary.  
 Define multiple delivery dates for the initial shares.  
 Define intermediate settlement dates.  
 
Appendix B. Data Sources and Variable Construction 
Stock price, volume of trade information, and financial statement data are obtained from 
the merged Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat databases. Asset 
sale and takeover data are obtained from SDC. Managerial compensation data are obtained 
from proxy statements.  
Short-sale constrained: We follow Diether and Werner (2008) and calculate the imputed 
loan fees that a short-seller would have to pay to a lender. Imputed loan fees are calculated each 
month for all firms on NYSE and Amex as −0.009 × the natural log of market equity − 0.021 × the 
natural log of book-to-market − 0.308 × the return in month t – 1 − 0.177 × the return over months 
t − 12 to t − 2 − 0.494 × institutional ownership as a fraction of shares outstanding −0.049 × 
natural log of stock price + 0.219 × natural log of turnover + 3.357 × standard deviation of daily 
returns over the prior 12 months − 0.096 × natural log of one plus the number of analysts + 
30.474 × risk free rate + 1.925. We calculate loan fees for Nasdaq firms using the same variables 
but with Nasdaq-specific coefficients. If the imputed loan fee in the calendar month prior to the 
repurchase announcement is greater than the 90th percentile for all stocks on the same 
exchange over all months in the period 2002–2008, then we code Short-sale constrained to 
equal one, otherwise it is equal to zero. 
Std. dev. returns: We calculate standard deviation of daily stock returns for the period 
starting 255 trading days prior to the repurchase announcement and ending 46 trading days prior 
to the repurchase announcement, where day 0 is the date on which the repurchase program is 
announced or the day the ASR is announced if the program included an ASR (and the ASR was 
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not announced simultaneously with the program). 
Illiquidity: Amihud (2002) defines illiquidity as the ratio of the daily absolute return to the 
dollar trading volume on that day. This ratio gives the absolute percentage price change per 
dollar of daily trading volume, or the daily price impact of the order flow. We average daily 
illiquidity for each firm over the period starting 255 trading days prior to the repurchase 
announcement and ending 46 trading days prior to the repurchase announcement. To minimize 
the influence of extreme values, we use the natural logarithm of illiquidity in our tests.  
Assets: Assets is book value of total assets (Compustat item 6).  
Cash/assets: Cash/assets is the ratio of cash and short-term securities (item 1) to total 
assets. 
Free cash flow: We follow Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007) and measure free 
cash flow by subtracting the sum of depreciation (item 14), tax payments (item 16), interest 
expense (item 15), and dividends (sum of items 19 and 21) from gross operating income (item 13) 
and scaling the difference by total assets.  
Std. dev. free cash flow: Standard deviation of free cash flow is calculated over the 5-year 
period preceding the repurchase or ASR announcement. We require a minimum of three 
consecutive years of operating income to calculate standard deviation of free cash flow.  
High-hedge, Low-hedge: We follow Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007) and create 
indicator variables to classify firms into groups based on the sign and magnitude of the 
correlation between cash flow and investment needs as proxied for by the correlation between a 
firm’s free cash flow and the median research and development (R&D) expenditures of its 
industry (defined at three-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) level) for the 3 years 
preceding the ASR or repurchase program announcement. High-hedge takes a value of one if a 
firm’s correlation between cash flow and investment needs is less than −0.2 and zero otherwise 
and Low-hedge takes a value of one if the firm’s correlation coefficient is greater than 0.2 and 
zero otherwise.  
Program percentage of equity: Program percentage of equity is the percentage of 
outstanding equity that the program authorizes for repurchase.  
Prior stock performance: Prior stock performance is the cumulative abnormal return over 
the period starting 44 trading days prior to the announcement and ending 4 days prior to the 
announcement, as in Kahle (2002).  
Market-to-book: Market-to-book is the ratio of market value of assets (common shares 
outstanding (item 25) times calendar year closing price (item 24) plus total assets (item 6) minus 
common equity (item 60) minus deferred taxes (item 74)) to book value of assets (item 6).  
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M/B firm, M/B sector, and M/B long-run: We follow Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and 
Viswanathan (2005) in decomposing the market-to-book ratio into three components. The first 
component, M/B firm, captures the difference between the observed price and a valuation 
measure that reflects current sector [Fama and French (1997) 48 industries] fundamentals. It is 
the difference between market value and fundamental value conditional on time and sector 
valuation effects and captures ‘‘purely firm-specific deviations from fundamental value.’’ The 
second component, M/B sector, captures the difference between valuation based on current 
sector fundamentals and valuation based on long-run sector fundamentals. The third component, 
M/B long-run, captures the difference between valuation based on long-run sector fundamentals 
and book value. M/B long-run is thus a proxy for long-run growth opportunities. We use the time 
period between 1996 and 2008 to calculate long-run values for different sectors.  
Asset sale: Asset sale is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm completed 
an asset sale in the 6 months prior to the announcement of the repurchase program or ASR.  
Takeover: Takeover is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm was the target 
of a takeover attempt in the 6 months preceding the announcement of its repurchase program or 
ASR.  
Leverage: Leverage is long-term debt (item 9) plus debt in current liabilities (item 34) 
divided by the sum of long-term debt, debt in current liabilities, and market value of equity.  
Leverage difference: Leverage difference is defined as a firm’s target leverage minus its 
actual leverage. Target leverage is estimated as in Flannery and Rangan (2006). Target 
leverage is the predicted value obtained by regressing the debt of all firms in Compustat between 
1995 and 2008 on firm-level explanatory variables including EBIT scaled by total assets, 
market-to-book, depreciation scaled by assets, log of assets, value of property, plant, and 
equipment scaled by total assets, R&D expenses scaled by assets, lagged industry median debt 
ratios, and a bond rating indicator variable.  
EPS bonus: EPS bonus is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if earnings per 
share is explicitly mentioned in the firm’s proxy statement as one of the determinants for the 
bonus plan of the chief executive officer (CEO) and zero otherwise.  
Chairman of the board: Chairman of the board is a dummy variable that takes a value of 
one if the CEO of the firm is also the chairman of the board of directors and zero otherwise.  
Voluntary turnover: The indicator variable Voluntary turnover is equal to one if the CEO is 
at least 60 years old based on the proxy statement preceding the program announcement and is 
no longer the CEO at the time of the first proxy statement at least one year after the program 
announcement. 
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Notes 
3. For a review of the payout literature, see Allen and Michaely (2003). 
4. The Financial Accounting Standards Board's Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) has, by 
consensus, agreed that an entity should account for an accelerated share repurchase as 
two separate transactions: (a) as shares of common stock acquired in a treasury 
transaction recorded on the acquisition date and (b) a forward contract indexed to its own 
common stock. See EITF Issue no. 99-7 “Accounting for an Accelerated Share 
Repurchase Program.” Also, see Dickinson, Kimmel, and Warfield (2008) for the 
accounting consequences of ASRs. 
5. For example, H.B. Fuller Co. announced in 1996 that, “Terms of the program allow the 
company to make such purchases from time to time at prevailing prices in the open 
market, by block purchase or in private transactions.” H.B. Fuller Co. announced in 2007 
that, “Under the program, the Company, at management's discretion, may repurchase 
shares for cash on the open market from time to time, in privately negotiated transactions 
or block transactions, or through an accelerated repurchase agreement.” 
6. As evidenced by the cross-sectional variation in both the amount and timing of actual 
repurchased in OMR programs, e.g., see Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Cook, 
Krigman, and Leach (2003), firms clearly utilize this flexibility. 
7. The standard language used to announce OMR programs justifies any actual repurchase 
outcome from zero to 100% of the total authorization, e.g., IRIS International’s 2008 
announcement notes that, “The timing and actual number of shares repurchased will 
depend on a variety of factors including the common share price, corporate and 
regulatory requirements and other market and economic conditions. The share 
repurchase program may be suspended or discontinued at any time.” 
8. Verifying repurchases of shares has become easier in recent years at the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) has required, since December 2003, that all 
U.S.-listed firms report monthly volume and price data on their repurchase activity in their 
quarterly filings (see Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by Issuers and Others, 
Exchange Act Release no. 33-8335 at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8335.htm). 
9. There are other reasons that we might expect larger programs to be more likely to include 
ASRs. For instance, an OMR-only program requires managers to devote time and 
attention to deciding whether or not to repurchase each day and at which price to 
repurchase. Thus, ASRs may free management from some of the demands on their time 
associated with administering OMRs. Additionally, replicating the credibility and 
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immediacy of an ASR is more difficult as the size of the repurchase program increases. 
Therefore, larger programs require more time to complete, thus delaying both the direct 
effects of the repurchase and the verification of the extent of the firm’s intention to 
repurchase shares. Lastly, any fixed costs associated with ASRs could also explain an 
increased likelihood of including an ASR in larger programs.  
10. See, for example, Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson (2006), Bens, Nagar, Skinner, and Wong 
(2003), and Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005). 
11. Keywords for the Edgar search were: accelerated share repurchase OR accelerated 
share buyback OR accelerated stock buyback or accelerated stock repurchase OR 
accelerated equity buyback OR accelerated equity repurchase OR overnight share 
repurchase OR overnight share buyback OR overnight stock buyback OR overnight stock 
repurchase OR overnight equity buyback OR overnight equity repurchase. The search 
terms for the Factiva search were: ‘‘(accelerated or overnight) and (share or equity or 
stock) and (repur* or buyback or buy-back or buy back)’’.  
12. It is necessary to confirm ASR transactions in SEC filings since the news search results 
often include announcements by firms that they are ‘‘accelerating’’ their repurchases. For 
example, Microsoft’s $19 billion repurchase in 2005 is not an ASR. Microsoft announced 
(as do a number of other firms over the sample period) that they were accelerating the 
pace of their repurchases, i.e., increasing the frequency of their open market repurchases 
to speed completion of an OMR-only program.  
13. We thank Ken French for the use of his industry definitions which may be obtained from 
his Web site at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/ 
changes_ind.html. 
14. A total of 154 of the 220 distinct program announcements associated with ASRs are from 
SDC. We identify the remaining program announcements via searches in Factiva.  
15. There are several other important differences between Chemmanur et al.’s (2010) 
sample formation procedure and ours. First, Chemmanur et al. drop program 
authorization announcements where a firm includes the option to execute the program 
via non-OMR transactions, e.g., privately negotiated repurchases, etc. Second, 
Chemmanur et al. conclude that, when an ASR from their hand-collected sample is also 
reported in SDC, SDC has erroneously classified an ASR as an OMR, so they drop these 
‘‘OMRs’’ from their sample.  
16. When we include the 60 programs for which the firms’ shares were short-sale constrained, 
the results of specification (1) of Table 3 are very similar. Further, when we vary the 
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short-sale constrained cutoff from the 90th percentile to the 85th or 80th percentile, we 
obtain very similar results to those reported. We have also conducted the analysis on the 
subsets of repurchase programs where all firms were required to have a minimum of 10% 
institutional ownership or to not have been subject to failures to deliver relative to 
outstanding shares greater than the 90th percentile for all firms over the same period. In 
both cases, the results are similar to those reported indicating that the reported results 
are robust to the choice of proxy for short-sale constraints.  
17. For an open market repurchase to qualify for ‘‘safe harbor’’ protection, a firm must satisfy 
the four criteria detailed in the SEC rule 10b-18 anti-manipulation guidelines. These four 
criteria are: (1) on any one day, firms may not purchase more than 25% of the average 
daily trading volume of their own shares during the prior 4 weeks, block trades and 
privately negotiated transactions are exempt from this guideline; (2) firms may not 
purchase their own shares in the opening and closing one-half hours of trading; (3) firms 
may not purchase their own shares at a price higher than the last independent bid, or the 
last reported sale price; and (4) all purchases on a single day must be executed through 
the same brokerage firm. This rule was adopted in November 1982. An ASR does not 
qualify for ‘‘safe harbor.’’  
18. We are able to identify the intermediary for 191 ASRs. We document a total of 15 distinct 
investment banks serving as ASR intermediaries. The market for ASR intermediaries 
appears fairly competitive with a Herfindahl Index of 1,322 (1,374) based on the number 
(dollar value) of transactions.  
19. This approach is similar to that taken in other repurchase contexts utilizing an 
intermediary, e.g., self-tender offers as in Lie (2002). Further, this approach is often taken 
in much of the literature examining securities issuance where the role of the intermediary 
(underwriter) is less mechanical, e.g., initial public offerings as in Pagano, Panetta, and 
Zingales (1998) and seasoned equity offerings as in Gao and Ritter (2010).  
20. The correlations of Std. dev. returns with Ln(Illiquidity) and Std. dev. free cash flow are 
0.33 and 0.28, respectively. The correlation between Ln(Illiquidity) and Std. dev. free 
cash flow is 0.07. While each of the correlations is significant at the 1% level, the 
respective variables enter the regressions with the same sign and significance level if 
included separately or in combination. Further, the variance inflation factors for these 
three variables are not larger than 4.89 for the ASR election regressions.  
21. In unreported results, we used alternative measures of undervaluation calculated as in 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) and Chemmanur et al. (2010). In short, of the six 
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alternative measures, two (multiples based on earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA)) entered the regression with a negative 
coefficient significant at the 10% level. Thus, these results appear sensitive to the 
algorithm used to estimate misvaluation and the particular measure employed. These 
results are available from the authors upon request.  
22. If the factors governing the inclusion of an ASR in a program are quite different from 
those which govern the fraction of the program completed via ASR, then a Tobit model of 
fraction completed via ASR is inappropriate. Using the test outlined by Greene (1993, p. 
701), we are able to formally examine whether the Tobit model should be rejected in favor 
of two separate models of the presence of an ASR and the fraction completed via ASR 
conditional on observing one. Using the explanatory variables from specification (1) of 
Table 3, this test provides strong evidence in favor of rejecting the Tobit model (w=205.2), 
indicating that the mechanisms governing the inclusion of ASRs and the fraction of 
programs completed via ASRs are quite different.  
23. Note that no ASRs were announced during the period in September 2008 when the SEC 
banned short-selling in the stocks of 799 financial firms.  
24. When we cannot get an exact ASR announcement date from a newswire report, we use 
as the announcement date the first day the information appears to be available to the 
public, i.e., the filing date of 10-K or 10-Q in which the ASR was first disclosed. We use a 
filing date in 36 instances (of 256 total ASR announcements). Given potentially 
confounding information in filings, we assess the robustness of our returns results to the 
exclusion of these observations. The results are very similar to those reported.  
25. In unreported results, we used alternative measures of undervaluation calculated as in 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004), and Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang (2010). 
The only significant coefficient of these six alternative measures is the coefficient on the 
price-to-valuation ratio based on a price-to-sales multiple calculated as in Chemmanur, 
Cheng, and Zhang (2010). However, this coefficient is positive and significant, the 
opposite of what we would expect if greater undervaluation is associated with greater 
announcement returns to ASRs. These results are available from the authors upon 
request.  
26. In unreported results, we have added indicator variables for the stated motivations for the 
ASRs as independent variables in specification (1) of Table 7. None of the coefficients on 
the indicator variables enter significantly. 
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Appendix 
Fig. 1: Accelerated Share Repurchase Structure and Timeline 
 
 
 
In an accelerated share repurchase, a firm enters into a contract with an intermediary, typically an 
investment bank, whereby the intermediary immediately delivers a specified number of the firm’s shares in 
exchange for cash based on an agreed upon price per share (ordinarily the most recent closing price). The 
intermediary obtains the shares that it delivers to the repurchasing firm by borrowing them, typically from 
institutions. The intermediary then covers its short position by purchasing shares in the market over a 
specified time period, normally several months. The ASR contract also includes a provision whereby the 
repurchasing firm is required to compensate or is entitled to receive compensation from the intermediary in 
shares or cash. The amount of compensation is based on part or all of the difference between the initial 
price per share paid to the intermediary and the estimated price per share the firm would have paid for the 
shares in an open market repurchase (OMR) conducted during the same period over which the 
intermediary buys the shares to cover its short position. The settlement terms are also structured to 
compensate the repurchasing firm for the opportunity cost of full prepayment for the initial shares when the 
intermediary actually acquires these shares (closes its short position) over a period of several months. 
Note that, absent any contractual caps or floors on the settlement amount, the repurchasing firm bears all 
of the risk of changes in its stock price between ASR initiation and settlement. Thus, the intermediary 
essentially acts as the firm’s proxy in borrowing the firm’s shares and the proceeds the intermediary 
receives at initiation are a source of financing for the intermediary. In sum, ASRs are repurchases with an 
associated forward contract that can be settled in cash or shares of the firm. 
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Fig. 2: Ratio of Announced ASRs to Repurchase Program Announcements 
by Year 
 
 
 
For each year of the sample period, we calculate the ratio of ASR announcements to total repurchase 
program announcements. 
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Fig. 3: The Frequency of ASRs and Potential Alternatives to ASRs by Year 
 
 
 
For each year of the sample period we report the frequency of announcements of: ASRs, privately 
negotiated repurchases, fixed-price self-tender offers, Dutch-auction self-tender offers, and large special 
dividends (defined as greater than 5% of outstanding equity). Data on self-tender offers and privately 
negotiated repurchases are from SDC and data on special dividends are from CRSP. 
 
37  Bargeron, Kulchania, Thomas 
Table 1: Frequency of ASRs by Year and Transaction Characteristics 
 
 
 
The sample includes 256 accelerated share repurchase (ASR) transactions announced between 1996 and 
2008. Details of the transactions were obtained from SEC filings and searches of newswires archived by 
Factiva. Panel A reports the frequency of announced ASRs by year. Panel B reports the size of the ASRs 
in terms of dollars allocated to repurchase shares, the percentage of outstanding equity repurchased in the 
ASR, and the percentage of the shares in the program repurchased via each ASR. Percentage price 
difference is the difference between the price paid to the intermediary under the ASR agreement and the 
closing price on the day prior to the ASR agreement divided by the prior day’s price. Also reported are 
days to settlement, the size of the settlement in dollars paid by the intermediary to the firm or by the firm to 
the intermediary, and the frequency the settlement is paid in cash. The frequencies with which the ASR 
agreements include caps and/or floors are also reported. Panel C reports the frequencies that firms stated 
particular motivations (not mutually exclusive) for undertaking ASRs. 
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Table 2: Characteristics of Firms by ASR Election 
 
 
The initial sample includes 256 accelerated share repurchase (ASR) transactions announced between 1996 and 2008. 
We match each ASR with the repurchase program that is simultaneous with or immediately precedes the ASR 
announcement. Repurchase program announcement data are obtained from the Securities Data Corporation and 
searches of Factiva. We limit the analysis below to ASRs announced in 2004 or later. Details on variable construction 
are provided in Appendix B. Short-sale contrained is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the imputed interest 
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rate on borrowing the firms’ shares [calculated as in Diether and Werner (2008)] for the calender month prior to the 
announcement exceeds the 90th percentile of all firms on the same exchange over 2002-2008 period. We limit the 
analysis to programs that are not short-sale contrained. Standard deviation of returns is calculated over a period of 
255 trading days prior to the repurchase announcement and ending 46 trading days prior to the repurchase 
announcement, where day 0 is the date on which the repurchase program is announced or the day the ASR is 
announced if the program included an ASR (and the ASR was not announced simultaneously with the program) 
Illiquidity is the Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity defined as the absolute percentage price change per dollar of daily 
trading volume, or the daily price impact of the order flow measuerd over the period of 255 trading days prior to the 
repurchase announcement and ending 46 days prior to the repurchase announcement. Assets is book value of total 
assets (Compustat item 6). Cash/assets is the ratio of cash and short-term securities (item 1) to total assets. Free cash 
flow is gross operating income (item 13) minus the sum of depreciation (item 14), tax payments (item 16), interest 
expense (item 15), and dividens (sum of items 19 and 21) scaled by total assets. Standard deviation of free cash flow 
is calculated over the 5-year period preceding the repurchase or ASR announcement. High-hedge takes a value of 
one if a firm’s correlation between cash flow and median industry R&D expenditures is less than −0.2 and zero 
otherwise. Low-hedge takes a value of one if the firm’s correlation between cash flow and median industry R&D 
expenditures is greater than 0.2 and zero otherwise. Program percentage of equity is the percentage of outstanding 
equity that the program authorizes for repurchase. Prior stock performance is the cumulative abnormal return over the 
period starting 44 trading days prior to the announcement and ending 4 days prior to the announcement. 
Market-to-book is the ratio of market value of assets (common shares outstanding (item 25) times calender year 
closing price (item 24) plus total assets minus common equity (item 60) minus deferred taxes (item 74)) to book value 
of assets. M/B firm, sector, and long-run are as in Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005). Asset sale is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm completed an asset sale in the 6 months prior to the announcement 
of the repurchase program or ASR. Takeover is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm was the target of a 
takeover attempt in the 6th months preceding the announcement of its repurchase program or ASR. Leverage is 
long-term debt (item 9) plus debt in current liabilities (item 34) divided by the sum of long-term debt, debt in current 
liabilites, and market value of equity. Leverage difference is defined as a firm’s target leverage minus its actual 
leverage. Target leverage is estimated as in Flannery and Rangan (2006). EPS bonus is a dummy variable that takes 
a value of one if earnings per share is explicitly mentioned in the firm’s proxy statement as one of the determinants for 
the bonus plan of the chief executive office (CEO) and zero otherwise. Chairman of the board is a dummy variable that 
takes a value of one if the CEO of the firm is also the chairman of the board of directors and zero otherwise. The 
indicator variable Voluntary turnover is equal to one if the EO is at least 60 years old based on the proxy statement 
preceding the program announcement and is no longer the CEO at the time of the first proxy statement at least one 
year after the program announcement. Significance of differences in means (medians) is assessed using a t-test 
(Wilcoxon rank sum test). ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 3: Logit Regressions of ASR Election 
 
 
 
Specifications (1) and (2) report ther results of logit regressions where the dependent variable takes a 
value of one if a firm included an ASR in its repurchase program and zero otherwise. Specification (3) 
reports the results of a logit regression where the dependent variable takes a value of one if a firm 
announces an ASR simultaneously with a repurchase program announcement and zero if a program is not 
associated with an ASR. Independent variables are as defined in Table 2. Industry controls are based on 
the 12 Fama and Fernch (1997) industry classifications. The coefficients on the independent variables are 
reported along with their p-values in brackets. Reported p-values are based on robust standard errors 
clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Fraction of Repurchase Program Completed via ASR 
 
 
 
Specification (1) reports the results of an ordinary least squares regression where the dependent variable 
is the cumulative fraction of a program that is completed via ASRs and the regression is estimated over the 
sample of programs including an ASR. Specifications (2), (3), and (4) report multinomial logit estimates 
derived from the sample of all repurchase programs. In these specifications, we group programs into three 
categories based on whether the fraction of the program complete via ASR is above 50% (the high fraction 
group), less than or equal to 50% (the low fraction group), or zero (the no ASR group). Specification (2) 
reports coefficients for low fraction ASR vs. no ASR. Specification (3) reports coefficients for high fraction 
ASR vs. no ASR. Specification (4) reports coefficients for low vs. high fraction ASR. Independent variables 
are as defined in Table 2. Industry controls are based on the 12 Fama and French (1997) industry 
classifications. The coefficients on the independent variables are reported along with their p-values in 
brackets. Reported p-values are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Predicted and Observed Frequencies of ASRs 
 
 
 
Panel A tabulates the yearly predicted and observed frequencies of ASRs as a percentage of repurchase 
program announcements. The probability of an ASR is estimated from the logit analysis in specification (1) 
of Table 3 using the 2004 to 2007 subsample. If the predicted probability is above the threshold probability 
that yields the observed number of ASRs within the subsample (32.90%), then we define the observation 
as a predicted ASR. If the probability is below the threshold, then an ASR is not predicted. The probability 
of an ASR for the out-of-coefficient estimates. The same threshold probability is applide to the 
out-of-sample observations. Panel B divides the out-of-sample observations in 2008 into terciles based on 
the estimated probability of an ASR. The first column on the panel tabulates the number of programs 
without an ASR within each tercile and the second column tabulates the number of programs with an ASR. 
The p-value from a Pearson chi-square test that thep roportion of ASR firms is the same in each tercile is 
listed at the bottom of the panel. *** Denotes significance at the 0.01 percent level. 
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Table 6: Abnormal Returns at ASR and Repurchase Program 
Announcement 
 
 
 
The table reports three-day (-1 to +1) cumulative abnormal returns for ASR and share repurchase program 
announcements. The ASR sample includes 256 ASRs announced between 1996 and 2008. Of these, 243 
ASRs were announced between 2004 and 2008. ASRs announced between 204 and 2008 are further 
subdivided into ASRs that are announced subsequent to a repurchase program announcement and ASRs 
that are announced simultaneously with a repurchase program announcement. Difference III-VI denotes 
the dfifference in abnormal returns between programs associaetd with simultaneous ASRs and programs 
not associated with ASRs. Difference V-VI denotes the difference in abnormal returns between programs 
associated with subsequent ASRs and programs not associated with ASRs. Significance of tests that 
mean (median) abnormal returns are different from zero is assessed using a t-test (Wilcoxon signed rank 
test). Significance of the number of positive versus number of negative is assessed using a sign test. * 
Denote significance at the 0.10 levels. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 7: OLS Regressions of Abnormal Returns and Logit Regression of 
ASR Election 
 
 
 
We limit the analysis in Table 7 to programs and ASRs announced in 2004 or later. Specifications (1) and (2) report the 
results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the 3-day cumulative abnormal return at ASR 
announcement. Percentage of equity is the percentage of outstanding equity repurchased in the ASR. Specification (3) 
reports the results of a logit regression where the dependent variable takes a value of one if a firm announced an ASR 
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subsequent to announcing a repurchase program and zero for programs not associated with an ASR. Program CAR3 
is the three-day cumulative abnormal return at the announcement of the repurchase program. Specification (4) reports 
results of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the three-day cumulative abnormal return at the program 
announcement. Simultaneous ASR is an indicator variable equal to one if an ASR is announced at the same time as 
the program announcement and zero otherwise. The sample for this test excludes programs that include a subsequent 
ASR. Specification (5) reports results of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is defined as follows. For 
programs not associated with an ASR, the dependent variable in the regression, Combined CAR3, is the abnormal 
return at the program announcement. For programs associated with an ASR, the dependent variable is the sum of the 
abnormal returns at the program announcement and the abnormal returns for any subsequent ASRs conducted within 
the program. The indicator variable ASR is equal to noe for a program that is associated with a simultaneous or 
subsequent ASR or zero otherwise. Industry controls are based on the 12 Fama and French (1997) industry 
classifications. The coefficients on the independent variables are reported along with their p-values in brackets. 
Reported p-values are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
